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Commentary
Courts Take Close Look
at Adult Use Regs
By Alan C. Weinstein
In st
be le
men
SE
busi
thar
that
prot
Regulations imposed on "adult businesses"' by state or local ary
government raise serious constitutional issues because the sex
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression ex- acti
tends to sexually oriented media.2 The importance of these con
issues can be seen in the fact that between 1976 and 1991, the ness
U.S. Supreme Court addressed five cases challenging the A s
constitutionality of state or local regulation of adult busi- whe
nesses. See Table 1. In addition, state and lower federal courts regL
have ruled on hundreds of adult business cases. This article thei
provides an update on recent adult business cases dealing few
with locational restrictions, public indecency laws, licensing A
requirements, and public health regulations. prec
There are several reasons
why adult business regula-
tions are challenged so fre- TAL . SUMRYO
quently. First, adult business
owners have a great deal at Case
stake financially. For ex-
ample, the August 8, 1988 Young v. American Mini-Theaters,
issue of Newsweek (p. 3) re- 427 U.S. 50 (1976), 28 ZD 329
ported that adult entertain- Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
ment grossed an estimated 452 U.S. 61 (1981), 33 ZD 254
$8 billion at that time. Fur- City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, In
thermore, adult business 475 U.S. 41 (1986), 38 ZD 310
owners have a good chance
of winning their court cases. FW/IPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
Regulations that impinge on 493 U.S. 215 (1990), 42 ZD 75
an adult business's freedom
of expression lose the pre-
sumption of constitutional- Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc.,
ity that normally applies to 111 s.Ct. 2456 (1991)
municipal ordinances, and
the burden of proof shifts to
local government to justify its restrictions. Also, cases testing pla
the federal constitutionality of regulations can be brought in nan
federal courts before judges with life tenure who most likely era
have significant experience with First Amendment issues. effo
Alan Weinstein is a professor of law and planning at Cleveland State
University's Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Levin College of
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1. The terms "adult business" or "adult entertainment business"
typically refer to bookstores, theaters, mini-theaters, video rental stores,
bars, and cabarets that purvey "adult entertainment" consisting of
performances or merchandise characterized by an emphasis on nudity
and sexual acts. See generally, J. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION OF ADULT
BUSINESSES (1992), and F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESSES
(1977). In this article, the terms "adult businesses" and "adult uses" are
used interchangeably.
2. Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Non-obscene pornography,
however, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment. See
Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), 28 ZD 329, and
Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
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ate courts, however, judges often are elected and may
ss familiar with the sophisticated issues of First Amend-
t law.
econd, local elected officials may be regulating adult
nesses stringently because of political pressure rather
planning or legal needs. Public officials normally argue
these regulations are justified because of the need to
ect adjacent areas from the adult uses' harmful second-
effects or to prevent related crimes, including drug sales,
ial assaults, prostitution, and illegal homosexual
vity. While adult businesses undeniably raise such
cerns, imposing stringent restrictions on these busi-
es is also very attractive politically to elected officials.
ignificant percentage of voters-probably an over-
liming majority-disapprove of adult uses and favor
lating them heavily, or even banning them. Despite
r numerous customers,' adult uses understandably have
vocal supporters.
dult use regulations must be drafted with skill and
ision and will often need to be supported by extensive
Description
fning studies because courts closely examine these ordi-
ces for First Amendment violations. Unfortunately, in an
of diminished public funding, the resources for such
rts may simply be unavailable. This fact, combined with
ng political pressure for fast but strict solutions, too often
luces ill-conceived and poorly drafted ordinances that
be successfully challenged.
REME COURT ADULT USE CASES
first three Supreme Court rulings on adult business
ulation listed in Table 1-Young, Schad, and City of
ton-involved challenges to municipal land-use ordi-
ces. The fourth case, FW/PBS, Inc., dealt with a chal-
e to the licensing provisions of a comprehensive adult
ness ordinance. In the fifth and most recent case,
The enormous extent of nationwide patronage for adult busi-
s-$8 billion in 1988-has already been shown. What that means
e local level can be illustrated by a 1994 federal district court
ion which revealed that a single "members only" club in suburban
yland that featured topless dancing had a membership list of 6,000.
aneh v. Hymes, - F. Supp. -, 1994 WL 29980 (D. Md.).
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Upholding a Detroit ordinance requiring
the dispersion of adult businesses.
Striking down a New Jersey municipality's
ban on all live entertainment.
Upholding a Seattle suburb's ordinance
concentrating adult businesses in five
percent of city.
Striking down licensing provisions of a
comprehensive adult business zoning
and licensing ordinance.
Upholding Indiana public indecency statute
that barred nude dancing performances.
C.,
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Barnes, a sharply divided Court upheld an Indiana public
indecency statute prohibiting public nudity that had been
enforced to bar nude dancing performances at two adult
businesses in South Bend.
These cases confirm that municipalities may single out
adult uses for special regulatory treatment if the municipal-
ity can show a substantial public interest in regulating such
uses unrelated to the suppression of speech and if the regula-
tions allow for a reasonable number of alternative locations.
However, the ordinance will be struck down when cities
attempt to regulate because they object to the sexually ex-
plicit messages conveyed by adult business. Courts will also
void regulations that seek to exclude all adult uses through
an outright ban, excessive locational requirements, or undue
discretion placed in the hands of officials who review appli-
cations for special use permits or business licenses.
LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS
The Supreme Court has approved ordinances that dis-
perse (Young) or concentrate (Renton) adult businesses if a
municipality can demonstrate that the ordinance is based
on a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech and sufficient alternative locations
remain available. In Young, the Court approved a Detroit
dispersion-type ordinance that was aimed at deterring the
negative secondary effects of adult businesses, such as
neighborhood deterioration or crime. While the Young
decision emphasized Detroit's well-documented studies
of local conditions, in Renton, the Court ruled that munici-
palities did not have to undertake their own studies, but
could rely on the findings of other cities if the local offi-
cials reasonably believed the findings were relevant to their
own problems with adult uses.
Reasonable Belief of "Secondary Effects"
In recent cases, this "reasonable belief" standard has been at
issue where it was alleged that: (1) local officials had not paid
enough attention to the findings of other cities to satisfy the
standard, or (2) the nature of the adult uses being regulated
were so different from the uses in the city where the studies
were done that the standard was not met. An example of the
first claim is seen in the case of Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc.
v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 800 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Miss.),
rev'd and remanded, 973 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1992).
Attention to Findings. In Lakeland, a federal district court
voided the ordinance because it found no indication that the
members of the city council had ever looked at the studies of
secondary effects experienced in other cities or received any
staff summaries of these studies. Acknowledging it was a
close question, the district court concluded that a summary
of the secondary effects should have been presented to the
council. In addition, the court said that the council should
have been able to produce evidence of its reliance on some
formal study leading to its conclusion that if the adult uses
were not regulated, the secondary effects would occur. This
decision was reversed on appeal-the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the members of the city council could
reasonably rely on the findings of the city's planning office
and city attorney, who undeniably considered the studies of
secondary effects. The municipality's loss in the lower court,
however, could easily have been avoided if the staff had
given the members of the city council a written report or
summary of the studies relied upon by those who prepared
the proposed ordinances and also orally presented the find-
ings contained in the report or summary to the council.
The correct approach to follow can be seen in Holmberg v.
City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140 (8th Cir. 1993), which upheld the
city council's conclusion regarding secondary effects. In
Holmberg, the city based this decision on reports of the city
planner, recommendations by the city planning commis-
sion, and local public hearings. In Thames Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of St. Louis, 851 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1988), 41 ZD 21, the
court upheld an ordinance in which the findings of second-
ary effects were based on a legislator's personal observations
and judgments together with the results of research from
other sources. However, in SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837
F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1988), 40 ZD 312, the court stated that
mere conclusory statements as to the deleterious effects of
adult businesses will not pass the standard.
Nature ofBusiness. The second issue, involving the nature
of the adult business, has arisen in cases where locational
requirements were applied to video stores whose patrons
rent or purchase materials to view at home. In ILQ Invest-
ments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 816 F. Supp. 516 (D.Minn.
1993), 45 ZD 351, the restrictions were applied to a video
store that offered both sexually explicit and non-sexually
explicit materials. However, in World Wide Video v. City of
Tukwila, 816 P.2d 18 (Wash. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. City of
Tukwila v. World Wide Video, 112 S.Ct. 1672 (1992), 44 ZD 96,
the affected video store dealt only in sexually explicit mate-
rial. In each case, the court ruled that none of the studies of
secondary effects relied upon by elected officials provided
evidence that take-out video stores cause the same type of
adverse effects as adult businesses in which material or
performances are viewed on premises.
In ILQ, the court further noted that there was no evidence
that the secondary effects created by businesses that offer
only sexually explicit material would result from a business
that offered both adult and standard videos.' These cases
strongly suggest hat regulation of take-out video stores that
offer adult entertainment cannot be based solely on findings
of secondary effects caused by adult businesses where pa-
trons view materials or performances on the premises, but
must be justified by a finding of specific negative secondary
effects associated with such take-out businesses.
4. California's highest court has made some interesting comments
about assessing the validity of the regulation of businesses that offer
both adult and standard material. In People v. Superior Court, 774 P.2d
769 (1989), 41 ZD 346, the city of Long Beach charged the operators of a
two-screen theater with unlawfully establishing an adult entertain-
ment business, in violation of the locational restrictions of a dispersion-
style ordinance, each time they exhibited an X-rated movie on one of the
screens. The California Supreme Court was unanimous in finding this
"single use" standard invalid-citing Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino
County, 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987), 41 ZD 43, which held that defining
a theater as an "adult use" based on a single showing of an adult movie
was unconstitutional absent evidence that a single showing would
have any harmful secondary effects on the community.
But the court was split 4-3 when it tried to define an appropriate
constitutional standard for an adult use. The majority (four justices)
rejected an earlier "preponderance" standard announced in Pringle v.
City of Covina, 171 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Cal. App. 1981), 33 ZD 121, in favor of
a new test, "the regular and substantial course of conduct" standard.
This new test would allow cities "greater flexibility" in regulating adult
uses while not allowing zoning to be used as a "'pretext for suppressing
expression."' Id. at 777, quoting Young at 427 U.S. 84.
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The Relevant Realty Market
The standard emerging from recent cases focuses on whether
there are an adequate number of potential sites for adult
businesses within the relevant local real estate market. In
Renton, the Supreme Court stated that while government
may not "effectively deny" adult businesses "a reasonable
opportunity to open and operate," adult businesses "must
fend for themselves in the real estate market on an equal
footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees . . ."-
Since the Renton decision, courts have struggled to develop a
standard for judging the reasonableness of locational restric-
tions. This standard is crucial because municipalities in regu-
lating adult uses can (consciously or otherwise) severely
restrict the number of potential sites available to adult uses
and/or require them to operate in undesirable locations. In
fact, the adult use regulations may reduce the number of
available sites to the extent that adult uses are banned in a
community. This exclusion of adult uses is particularly likely
when combined with amortization provisions forcing fast
termination or relocation of adult uses.6
This "real estate market" standard appeared initially in
Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1992), 44 ZD
359. There, after recognizing that Renton "contemplated that
there was a 'market' in which [adult] businesses could pur-
chase or lease real property on which business could be
conducted," the court ruled that "land with physical charac-
teristics that render it unavailable for any kind of develop-
ment, or legal characteristics that exclude adult businesses,
may not be considered 'available' for constitutional pur-
poses under Renton." The court, however, declined to ad-
dress "the relationship between the economics of site location
and the constitutionality of an adult business zoning ordi-
nance." Id. at 1306.
Subsequently, in Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), 45 ZD 273, the Ninth Circuit
squarely faced the economics question avoided in Woodall.
The court recognized that the distinction between economic
and other factors is difficult to maintain because physical
and legal unavailability can be presented as economic un-
availability. For example, a site located five miles from the
nearest public road could be seen either as physically un-
available or, given the cost of constructing an access route, as
economically unavailable. The Ninth Circuit argued that the
economics of site location is a valid inquiry, so long as the
economic analysis focuses on whether a site is part of the
relevant real estate market. The Ninth Circuit said:
Accordingly, we do not think that Renton forbids a court to
consider economics when evaluating whether a particular
site is in fact part of the real estate market. For purposes of
Renton, the distinction is between consideration of eco-
nomic impact within an actual business real estate market
5. 475 U.S. at 54. In Renton, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's finding that there were no "commercially viable" sites for
adult businesses in a largely developed 520-acre area, amounting to five
percent of all land in the city, to which adult businesses were restricted.
6. See, e.g., Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305 modifying 950
F.2d 255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 304 (1992) (requiring all 39 adult
businesses in city to relocate); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928
F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1991) (requiring at least 30 of 36 adult businesses to
relocate to 0.54 percent of the total land area of the city).
and consideration of cost to determine whether a specific
relocation site is part of the relevant market. A court may
not consider the former, but it may consider the latter when
determining whether a specific site is reasonably suitable
for the operation of a business. 989 F.2d 1530.
After reviewing several decisions involving locational re-
strictions, the Ninth Circuit in Topanga Press noted the pre-
requisites for a particular site to be deemed part of the
relevant real estate market. In Renton, the Court stressed that
properties need only be "potentially" available to be part of
the relevant real estate market. However, the Ninth Circuit
in Topanga Press argued that, first, "a property is not 'poten-
tially' available when it is unreasonable to believe that it
would ever become available to any commercial enterprise."
Second, sites in manufacturing or industrial zones are part of
the market if they are: reasonably accessible to the general
public; have a proper infrastructure of sidewalks, roads, and
lighting; and are generally suitable for some form of com-
mercial enterprise. Third, and most obviously, commercially
zoned locations are part of the real estate market. Once a site
qualifies as part of the real estate market under these criteria,
however, its "commercial viability" as an adult business
location is irrelevant.
The court applied these criteria to the challenged Los
Angeles ordinance. Much of the land "potentially available"
for the relocation of adult businesses, the Ninth Circuit
ruled, was not part of the real estate market. Accordingly,
this appeals court struck down the ordinance because it did
not provide sufficient "reasonably available" sites for the
relocation of adult businesses. Among the areas that the
court identified as outside the relevant real estate market
were thousands of acres submerged beneath the ocean or
harbor, landing strips at Los Angeles Airport, a 200-acre
landfill, 600 acres used for the Van Nuys airport, 4,357 acres
used by the Port of Los Angeles and/or oil refineries, land
occupied by a defense plant, a GM plant, junkyards, steel-
yards, car storage lots, hospitals, and other large institutions.
Id. at 1532.
The Topanga Press approach presents a workable standard
for judging whether sites for adult businesses are "reason-
ably available." While this approach allows consideration of
economic factors to define the relevant real estate market, it
bars consideration of "commercial viability" for particular
sites that are found to be within the relevant market. In effect,
it permits municipalities to impose significant locational
restrictions on adult businesses to avoid undesirable second-
ary effects, but it prevents local government from effectively
banning such businesses by exiling them to locations that
present insuperable physical, legal, or economic barriers to
operation or development.
The starting point for drafting locational restrictions to
meet the Topanga Press test is, of course, the three factors
already noted. In addition, planners need to be cautious
about how much spacing requirements reduce the number
of sites available for adult uses. For example, an ordinance
provision that no adult use may locate within 1,000 feet of
another adult use or within 1,000 feet of a church, school, or
playground can dramatically reduce the available sites. To
better understand the effect of a 1,000 foot distancing re-
quirement, consider that the requirement erects an imagi-
nary circular fence enclosing 72 acres that are barred to adult
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uses. (The 1,000 foot requirement creates a circle with a
radius of 1,000 feet and thus an area of 3,141,600 square feet,
which equals 72 acres.) As new adult uses are established,
new 72-acre circles banning adult uses are created.
NUDE DANCING AND PUBLIC INDECENCY LAWS
As noted earlier, in Barnes v. Glen Theatres, 111 S.Ct. 2456
(1991), two adult businesses claimed a violation of their First
Amendment rights when Indiana's public indecency statute
was applied to ban totally nude dancing as a form of enter-
tainment. After a lengthy journey through the federal courts,
a majority of the Seventh Circuit concluded that non-ob-
scene nude dancing performed for entertainment is expres-
sion protected by the First Amendment. The public indecency
statute applied to this dancing, the court ruled, was an
improper infringement of that expressive activity because its
purpose was to prevent the message of eroticism and sexual-
ity conveyed by the dancers. See Miller v. Civil City of South
Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court
reversed this judgment, but failed to reach a single rationale
for its decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, delivered the opinion of the Court
upholding the statute, with Justices Scalia and Souter writ-
ing separate concurring opinions. Justice White, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion acknowledged
that nude dancing is expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment, but found that it was only "marginally"
within the amendment's "outer perimeters." Rehnquist ar-
gued that the statute was not aimed at the erotic message
conveyed by the dancing but sought to ban all public nudity,
whether or not it is combined with expressive activity. Thus,
according to Rehnquist, the statute should be seen as a form
of "time, place or manner" restriction which could be judged
under the standards set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968).8
Rehnquist found that Indiana's public indecency statute
used the state's police power to further a substantial govern-
ment interest in protecting order and morality by banning
public nudity. Restricting nudity on moral grounds, Rehnquist
argued, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. (In
making this point, Rehnquist relied on language in O'Brien
rejecting an "expansive" notion of expression as any conduct
7. The Indiana statute declares that anyone who knowingly or inten-
tionally appears in a state of nudity in a public place commits "public
indecency," a Class A misdemeanor. Nudity is defined as "the showing
of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less
than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less
than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of
the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." Ind. Code § 35-
45-4-1 (1988).
8. O'Brien held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. In O'Brien, the
Court stated a four-part test for evaluating government regulations that
incidentally affect expressive activity. The government regulation is
sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. 391 U.S. at 376-377.
intended to express an idea.) Rehnquist denied the conten-
tion that, while the statute's general prohibition on public
nudity may be unrelated to suppressing free expression, by
banning nude dancing the state seeks to prevent its erotic
message. Specifically, Rehnquist asserted that the state was
not proscribing nudity because of the erotic message, but
was only "making the message slightly less graphic" by
requiring dancers to wear "pasties" and "G-strings" and
thereby addressing the evil it sought to prevent-public
nudity.
It was not the dancing, with its communicative element,
that the state prohibited, but public nudity, whether or not it
is combined with expressive activity. Finally, and no doubt
with tongue in cheek, Justice Rehnquist found that the public
indecency statute was narrowly tailored to achieve its end,
since the requirement that dancers wear at least "pasties"
and a "G-string" was the "bare minimum" necessary to
achieve the state's purpose. See 111 S.Ct. at 2463.
Justices Scalia and Souter concurred in the upholding of
the Indiana statute, but they disagreed about why it should
be upheld. Justice Scalia viewed the public indecency law as
a general law regulating conduct and not specifically di-
rected at expression. Thus, he argued the statute should not
be subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. By contrast,
Justice Souter provided a far more cautious fifth vote to
uphold the statute. He agreed with both the plurality and
dissent that the nude dancing at issue in this case is subject to
a degree of First Amendment protection, and agreed with
the plurality's use of the O'Brien test. But, he wrote sepa-
rately because he viewed the justification for the statute to be
not public morality-the position taken by both the plurality
and Justice Scalia-but the substantial governmental inter-
est in combating the secondary effects of businesses offering
nude dancing as entertainment. Souter's analysis under the
O'Brien test thus finds support in both the Young and Renton
decisions. 111 S.Ct. at 2469-2470.
The four dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice White,
argued that the statute serves different purposes when it
bans nudity in two settings-adult establishments versus
public places such as beaches and parks. In the latter case, the
purpose is to protect the public from offense. But in the
former case, since the viewers are adults who have willingly
paid to be in attendance, the purpose is to protect the viewers
from what the state believes is the harmful message that
nude dancing communicates. Thus, in White's view,
Rehnquist's argument that the state is not "prohibiting nu-
dity because of the erotic message conveyed by the dancers"
but only because of the nudity, is "transparently erroneous"
because the nudity is itself an expressive component of the
dance, not merely incidental "conduct."9
Since the statute directly regulates expressive activity,
White argues, it may be justified only by a compelling state
interest that is narrowly drawn. Indiana impermissibly chose
9. "It is only because nude dancing performances may generate
emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the spectators
that the State seeks to regulate such expressive activity, apparently on
the assumption that creating or emphasizing such thoughts and ideas
in the minds of spectators may lead to increased prostitution and the
degradation of women. But generating thoughts, ideas, and emotions is
the essence of communication. The nudity element of nude dancing
cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere 'conduct' independent of any
expressive component of the dance." Id. at 2474 (footnote omitted).
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to ban an entire category of expressive activity, White as-
serted, rather than narrowly tailoring a statute to address
prostitution and associated evils, or using its authority un-
der the 21st Amendment to regulate nude dancing in bars."o
Justice Souter's concurring opinion has strongly influ-
enced subsequent court decisions because he cast the fifth
crucial vote to uphold the statute. In Barnes, Rehnquist and
Scalia gave a green light to state and local governments to
bar nude dancing on public morality grounds; however,
Justice Souter's concurring opinion requires such regula-
tions to be aimed at preventing harmful secondary effects of
the adult uses. As a result, courts have routinely upheld
ordinances prohibiting nude dancing in adult entertainment
establishments based on a showing that the ordinance was
aimed at avoiding undesirable secondary effects." The courts,
however, have struck down ordinances that extended the
nude dancing ban to "mainstream" establishmentsl2-or,
conversely, upheld exceptions to the ban that are limited to
"mainstream" establishments"-because there is no evidence
that nude dancing in such establishments produces undesir-
able secondary effects. Courts also have not hesitated to
strike down ordinances (targeting nude dancing) that were
motivated by an intent to suppress protected expression
rather than to prevent harmful secondary effects. See Triplett
Grille, Inc. v. City ofAkron, 816 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
Similarly, courts have voided ordinances regulating nude
dancing on the basis that the ordinances were unconstitu-
tionally vague or overbroad. See Pel Asso, footnote 12.
LICENSING ORDINANCES
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), six
Justices of the Supreme Court found that the licensing provi-
sions of a comprehensive adult business ordinance raised
significant First Amendment problems because the licensing
requirement imposed a prior restraint on freedom of expres-
sion. A prior restraint was found because, rather than penal-
izing expression after it occurred, the licensing scheme
prevented the expression from occurring in the first place.
While such prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se,
there is a strong presumption that they are not constitution-
ally valid. The six Justices split evenly, however, on what
procedural safeguards were required to validate an adult
use licensing ordinance.
All Justices agreed that such ordinances must not "place
unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or
agency"; must require a definite time limit within which the
decision maker must issue or deny the license, during which
time the status quo must be maintained; and must allow for
10. See Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986) (per curiam); New
York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam);
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378
(E.D. Ky. 1993); Dodger's Bar & Grill v. Johnson County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 815 F. Supp. 399 (D. Kansas 1993); O'Malley v. City of
Syracuse, 813 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. N.Y. 1993); Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga.
203,429 S.E.2d 663 (1993); S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 263 Ga. 267,
430 S.E.2d 726 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Pel Asso, Inc. v. Joseph, 262 Ga. 904,427 S.E.2d 264 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Top Shelf, Inc. v. Mayor and Aldermen for City of
Savannah, 840 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Ga. 1993); S.J.T., supra note 11, at n.17.
prompt judicial review if the license is erroneously denied.
But in addition, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
argued that a licensing ordinance must require that the
government bear both the burden of going to court to enforce
the denial of a license application and the burden of proof in
court. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion arguing for the
lesser standard, which was joined by Justices Kennedy and
Stevens. Justice Brennan's opinion calling for the stricter
standard was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun."
Recent decisions applying the FW/PBS ruling have struck
down licensing ordinances that lacked effective time limita-
tions (see Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 831 F.
Supp. 1241 (D.Md. 1993), 46 ZD 111), or failed to limit the
discretion of city officials to grant or deny a license. See Wolff
v. City of Monticello, 803 F. Supp. 1568 (D.Minn. 1992), 45 ZD
257. On the other hand, courts have upheld ordinances with
the appropriate safeguards. See 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v.
Prince George's County, 828 F. Supp. 370 (D.Md. 1993), 46 ZD
112.
Courts have also struck down licensing ordinances that
charged higher fees for adult businesses, because this regu-
lated on the basis of the content of expression (see AAK, Inc. v.
City of Woonsocket, 830 F. Supp. 99 (D.R.I. 1993)) or required
licensing of shareholders in an adult business, because this
did not advance any substantial governmental interest unre-
lated to suppression of speech. See T.K.'s Video, Inc. v. Denton
County, 830 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
Also, courts have applied the FW/PBS standard to strike
down conditional use requirements that raise concerns about
a prior restraint identical to those raised by a licensing
ordinance, requirements that vested overbroad discretion in
a city official-see 11126 Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George's
County, 684 F.2d 884 (D. Md. 1988) and J.L. Thomas, Inc. v.
County of Los Angeles, 283 Cal. Rptr. 815 (2d Dist. 1991)-or
did not provide for specific time limits for decision making.
See Thomas, supra, and People v. Library One, Inc., 280 Cal.
Rptr. 400 (2d Dist. 1991).
PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATIONS
Recently, numerous courts have addressed the regulation of
adult businesses via public health regulations rather than
zoning. Often these courts assess the constitutionality of
regulations that require adult businesses to make viewing
booth interiors open to public view by removing the booth
doors.5 These "open door" requirements designed to de-
crease illicit sexual activity and/or the spread of AIDS,'6
14. The procedural safeguards about which the Justices disagreed
were first stated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
15. See Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establish-
ments, 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993); Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 898 F.2d
612 (8th Cir. 1990); Berg v. Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion
County, 865 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1989), 41 ZD 325; Bamon Corp. v. City of
Dayton, 730 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1990), 42 ZD 348; Postscript Enters. v.
City of Bridgeton, 699 F. Supp. 1393 (E.D. Mo. 1988); Suburban Video v.
City of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis. 1988), 41 ZD 165; Adult
Entertainment Center v. Pierce County, 57 Wash. App. 435, 788 P.2d
1102 (Wash. App. 1990).
16. Many of the cases cited in the preceding footnote document the
extent to which viewing booths with closed doors may be used for illicit
sexual activities by facilitating sexual activity either between two per-
sons occupying a single booth or by persons in adjoining booths by
means of a hole in a common wall,
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have been upheld as valid "time, place, and manner" restric-
tions on expression" that do not implicate patrons' privacy
rights."*
However, such ordinances may still be invalid, in part, if
they violate other constitutional safeguards. For example, in
Suburban Video v. City of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis.
1988), the court invalidated those portions of the ordinance's
adult business licensing scheme that required applicants to
supply large amounts of personal information that had no
relationship to the ordinance's stated purpose of fighting the
spread of AIDS. In effect, the courts found that these provi-
sions were an unjustified prior restraint on expression and
violated owners' and employees' right to privacy.
CONCLUSION
These recent court decisions provide local officials with
clear guidelines to follow when enacting adult businesses
regulations. First, and most critically, officials must recog-
nize that the only permissible goal of adult business regu-
lation is the reduction of their undesirable secondary effects,
and that courts will not hesitate to invalidate zoning re-
17. See Mitchell, Berg, and Adult Entertainment Center, footnote 15.
18. See Berg, Adult Entertainment, Bamon, and Suburban Video, footnote
15. In these cases the courts rejected arguments that patrons have a
constitutional right to view adult films (Berg) or engage in sexual
activity, including masturbation (Adult Entertainment), behind closed
doors in a public establishment.
strictions and other forms of regulation-including
restrictions on nude erotic dancing-when they are merely
a pretext for eliminating or unduly restricting adult
businesses.
Second, because courts are scrutinizing the secondary
effects justification for adult business regulation more
closely, local officials must exercise caution if they choose
to rely on the findings of other communities, rather than
documenting the negative impacts of secondary effects in
their own community. Courts are now requiring officials
to demonstrate that they gave a reasonable degree of
consideration to such findings prior to enacting their own
restrictions. Judges are also reexamining to what degree
any given local adult business may differ from the busi-
nesses in the community whose documented secondary
effects were used by local officials to justify their own
regulations.
Third, since local officials must expect that their locational
restrictions will be reviewed under the "relevant real estate
market" standard, they should ensure that their regulations
leave adult businesses with an adequate number of sites that
are either zoned for commercial development or, if zoned
otherwise, are generally suitable for some form of commer-
cial enterprise. Finally, courts will give local officials signifi-
cant leeway, but not total latitude, when enacting regulations
to address the public health concern raised by adult busi-
nesses, such as restrictions that seek to prevent patrons from
engaging in sexual activity on the premises.
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